Iran v. United States et al: The Two
Level Game
The dynamic of the two-level
game, as it applies to International Relations, hereinafter referred to as IR,
has many varied effects on the nuclear negotiations between the Iran and the
United States of America, hereinafter referred to as “the U.S. or the United
States. The following discussion points are primarily my own observations
supplemented by the thoughts of others to illustrate how the two-level game can
both restrain and liberate level one agents (negotiators).
On, or about, 09 March 2015 47
U.S. Senators engaged in a conspicuous and arguably illegal attempt to
influence and constrain (or outright stop) the U.S. negotiators ability to
reach an agreement with Iran regarding nuclear capabilities. They had argued
that any deal reached between the President’s of Iran and the U.S., by and
through their duly appointed representatives, must first be approved by the
Congress (Senate) of the U.S. or else it could be amended in part, or in whole,
by congress (That would be a very loose interpretation of US Const. Article
II, sec. 2, clause 2); a later president could revoke the agreement; or a later
president could amend the agreement (Cotton, 2015). One could argue that this letter had
detrimental effect on the relations with Iran regarding the nuclear deal,
especially given the speech given by Netanyahu to a Joint Session of Congress
(U.S. Congress) that occurred just days before on 03 March 2015; in this
author’s own opinion, the letter gave the impression that the Senators were in
league with the State of Israel and issued a letter as a directive of
Netanyahu. Were this opinion held by Tehran as well, it could have derailed the
entire negotiation. Fortunately, both Washington and Tehran censured the
Netanyahu and the rogue senators the days following the events, respectively
and jointly dismissed them both. (Al Jazeera, 2015)
While many would argue that
the speech and the letter would have greatly limited Obama’s win-set, even down
to a null set, but the truth of the matter is that this might have given Obama
more power than he had originally. This letter would have given Obama the
ability to argue that Tehran must be profoundly generous in their offers, lest
the Senate reject the deal outright (arguably, an up-down vote is the only
authority the Senate has, but they will make their opinions known before any
provisional agreement is made, thus making de facto line-item vetoes to
potential treaty submissions). While the Administration may take the position
of devil’s advocate against the hard-liners, precedent has already been set by
the Bush administration to sign binding treaties without consent and consul by
congress.
In 2008, President Bush, by
and through a duly appointed representative, signed a Status of Forces
Agreement with Iraq (SOFA) during his final weeks as president. This agreement
outlined an entire withdrawal and transfer of authority plan, enumerating
various events that culminated with the withdrawal of U.S. forces in 2011.
(U.S. Department of State, 2008) As outlined in the letter from Tom Cotton, et
al, any such agreement between nations that is signed without the consent and
consul of the senate is an executive agreement and is subject to change by
later presidents. The problem here is that executive agreements involve
agreements that are carried out between the sitting presidents; the SOFA
outlined a plan that created obligations that applied almost entirely to a
future president and were binding in nature. This was, by all intents and
purposes, a de facto treaty with all the pretenses, benefits, and obligations
thereof. Because the U.S. government agreed to such terms through agents
authorized to make such agreements, the government would be morally, and
arguably legally, obligated to honor the terms. This is exceptionally true in
an international environment built on multiple future interactions where a nation’s
word is their bond and breaking their bond can have dire consequences. As such,
this precedent, afforded the president to agree to whatever terms he felt to be
valid, thus leaving the U.S. honor bound to uphold their agreement.
Now, Tehran, already suffering
sanctions from the world that the world had no real interest in strengthening
unless forced, was in a situation where they could be generous with their
terms, within reason. With the possibility of relief of sanctions and the
development of nuclear power, the incentive to reach a deal is great, especially
with the increased social and economic liberalization of the Iranian youth
affecting domestic politics. While the obvious benefit of an agreement for Iran
is increased trade due to relief of sanctions, nuclear power development could
free up oil resources for exports. However, the Iranian regime must also
appeal, and even capitulate, to the interests of the liberal youth for fear of
an “Iranian Spring”. (Hall, 2015)
This liberal bloc of Iranians forces
the Conservative leadership to balance their own rhetoric against the west with
the interests of the growing youth. It is this dual interest of the domestic
Iranians that was aided by the open letter to Iran. The letter from the
Senators gave the Iranian leaders an out with the conservatives by arguing that
the agreement was made in spite of the fierce western and Israeli opposition,
which could be marketed as a huge win for Iranian pride, while softening
relations with the west and increasing the economic wealth that will benefit
the youth of Iran as they grow and form families.
In the end, the reckless
actions of the American domestic politicians enabled both international leaders
from Iran and the U.S. to achieve their objectives, though Iran’s leadership
benefitted more domestically. President Obama, being term limited and stuck
with an already intransigent U.S. congress, had nothing left to lose and could
afford to go for broke as it were.
Works Cited
Cotton, Tom. "Open Letter to Iran." (n.d.): n. pag. Web.
21 June 2015.
Hall, John. "The Changing Face of Iran: How Nation's Hardline
Islamic Image Is Being Slowly Erased from within as Liberal Youths Now Make up
the Majority of the Population." Daily Mail UK. N.p., 10 Apr.
2015. Web. 21 June 2015.
<http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3033357/The-changing-face-Iran-nation-s-hardline-Islamic-image-slowly-erased-liberal-youths-make-majority-population.html>.
"Iran and Obama Dismiss Netanyahu Speech to US
Congress." Al Jazeera America. N.p., 04 Mar. 2015. Web. 21
June 2015.
<http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/03/iran-obama-dismiss-netanyahu-speech-congress-150304044156588.html>.
"#IranLetter Sparks 'treason' Charge against US
Senators." Al Jazeera America. N.p., 10 Mar. 2015. Web. 21
June 2015. <http://stream.aljazeera.com/story/201503101321-0024618>.
"Status Of Forces Agreement." U.S. Department of State,
n.d. Web. 21 June 2015.
<http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/122074.pdf>.
